The problems of commissioned oral history: the swine flu ' crisis' of 2009 by Berridge, Virginia & Taylor, Suzanne
86 ORAL HISTORY Autumn 2019
Introduction 
Since the millennium there has been discussion in the 
oral history field of ‘crisis oral history’, with work on 
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the Haitian earth-
quake, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and other crisis 
events.1 Recent discussion of oral history and crisis has 
its precursor in research on a health crisis and method-
ological discussions in the 1980s and 1990s about the 
use of oral history among other sources for research 
on the history of the HIV/AIDS crisis, in which I 
(Berridge) was involved, along with historians in the 
US.2 Another ongoing discussion, not specifically tied 
to oral history, has been about the problems that can 
arise in carrying out government-commissioned and 
government-funded research. For example, in 2016 
Sense about Science published Missing Evidence: An 
Inquiry into the Delayed Publication of Government 
Commissioned Research, led by a former Lord Justice 
of Appeal, the Rt Hon Sir Stephen Sedley. It argued 
that ‘delayed publication can be as damaging as indef-
inite suppression because it deprives parliamentarians, 
the media, NGOs and others of the timely access they 
need in order to be able to engage with policy forma-
tion in the light of contemporaneous evidence’.3  
The purpose of the current article is twofold: to 
discuss the result – the policy-relevant issues – that 
came out of an oral history project dealing with what 
had been perceived at the time as a health emergency, 
but also, in the context of debates on government-
funded research, to reflect on the difficulties inherent 
in the relationship that this project entailed. In this case 
the funding source, ethical permission and the timing 
of project publication caused major problems for the 
research. This paper is presenting results for the first 
time, some years after the events. 
The project: swine flu 2009 and the role of 
the Health Protection Agency 
Swine flu hit the UK in April 2009. The Health 
Protection Agency (HPA) was one of the central 
government agencies at the forefront of the response 
and was proud of its role. One of its senior staff, who 
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had an honorary appointment at the London School 
of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) and an 
interest in history, approached me to see if I would be 
interested in conducting an oral history study. The 
aims were to document how responses had evolved in 
order to gain insight into organisational links that had 
operated, and to provide a resource for future 
pandemic planning and future research into the 
history of public health. The outputs were to include 
a web booklet on the HPA website and other publica-
tions as well as the archiving of the interviews. I was 
attracted to the project through my own research 
interests in public health and the relationship of 
history to policy. I had a wide portfolio of publications 
in the contemporary history of health and had used 
oral history in policy-making circles, a very different 
focus from the history-from-below oral history which 
had been part of my earlier work on opium.4 I had 
also reflected on the oral history of elites and the 
different issues it presented in several publications.5 
My institution, the LSHTM, is a global centre for 
public health research and provides useful ongoing 
contacts for the Centre for History in Public Health, 
a group of professional historians of which I was 
director at the time. Our location in the midst of 
epidemiologists, health economists and other health 
disciplines was unusual for the historical profession. 
The project was also opportune in the present-day 
academic world in providing employment for Dr 
Suzanne Taylor, who had been working for me as a 
researcher and who was coming to the end of her 
contract.  
A staff member in the LSHTM research grants 
section warned me that the contract was a standard 
government one, which gave the funding department 
ownership of the research and hence could prevent 
publication. However, this caveat was not seen at the 
time as a reason for not going ahead. 
The background: the HPA, swine flu 
First, some context is in order. What was the HPA? It 
was an arm’s-length organisation, a Special Health 
Authority originally formed in 2003 from an amalga-
mation of several government agencies. The impetus 
for its establishment came from the post-millennium 
concern about the threat presented both by infectious 
disease and by exposure to chemical and radiological 
hazards, possibly through deliberate release by a terror-
ist organisation. The new organisation brought 
together several existing government health and 
surveillance agencies, including the Public Health 
Laboratory Service (PHLS) and the Communicable 
Disease Surveillance Centre (CDSC). The aim, artic-
ulated in an influential report from the government’s 
Chief Medical Officer (CMO), Getting Ahead of the 
Curve, was to ensure that health protection and emer-
gency planning operated effectively from the national 
to the local level.6 In 2005 the HPA incorporated the 
National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB) and 
was reconstituted as a non-departmental public body: 
this meant it was at arm’s length from government. As 
well as its constituent bodies, it had a regional and local 
organisational dimension with parts of the agency 
operating at those levels. The HPA, prior to swine flu, 
gained considerable experience in dealing with a range 
of serious threats to public health, including SARS 
(severe acute respiratory syndrome) in 2003, polonium 
poisoning with the Litvinenko case in 2006, the Bunce-
field explosion in 2005 and the London terrorist 
bombings in the same year. Its brief included: provid-
ing independent advice to government; support for the 
NHS and other organisations; the monitoring and 
response to new threats to public health; and improve-
ment of knowledge through research and training. 
Pandemic planning was very much to the fore after 
the millennium. The new avian influenza virus 
(H5N1), shown as passing from birds to humans in 
1997, had sparked global interest. Official investiga-
tions took place at both national and international level. 
The House of Lords Science and Technology Commit-
tee published its report Fighting Infection in 2003.7 The 
World Health Organization had set out guidelines for 
preparedness in 2005 and the European Union and 
member states also developed plans after 2005. In 
Britain contingency plans were published by the 
Department of Health at the same time.8 The House 
of Lords Science and Technology Committee 
published a report, Pandemic Influenza, soon after this, 
which raised concerns about the existing plans.9 The 
Royal Society and the Academy of Medical Sciences 
also published a report on the role of science in plan-
ning, recommending some changes to the structures 
for planning and response.10 The Department of 
Health and the Cabinet Office then published 
Pandemic Flu: A National Framework for Responding to 
a Pandemic in November 2007.11 This document 
formed the basis for the response to the 2009 swine 
flu outbreak. The plans were tested with several plan-
ning exercises, among them one codenamed ‘Winter 
Willow’, held in early 2007, which identified a number 
of issues that subsequently proved problematic in 
2009. Nevertheless, the HPA’s role was clearly set out, 
with levels of response and a clear reporting structure.12 
The National Health Service was to be the operational 
lead, running a national service dealing with an 
outbreak or epidemic, while the HPA would play a 
subsidiary but vital role providing information and 
surveillance for decision making. A follow-up inquiry 
by the House of Lords was underway when the 
pandemic struck in April 2009, providing a real-time 
test. It should be noted that the shorthand popular 
term ‘swine flu’ was used (just as ‘bird flu’ was used at 
the turn of the century to characterise avian flu) 
because the flu virus was similar to one that also 
affected pigs. The outbreak began in Mexico in April 
2009 and spread worldwide due to the absence of 
immunity to the new virus, among young people in 
particular. 
The first two confirmed cases were on 27 April 
2009: a couple who had returned to Scotland from 
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Mexico. Over the next seventeen months, the UK saw 
two waves of infection. Responses moved from the 
initial policy of containment of spread, to a strategy of 
treatment only, and then to a vaccination programme. 
An extensive H1N1 (the official swine flu virus name) 
information campaign was mounted across all media. 
The vaccination programme, which began in October 
2009, focussed on specific risk groups: young people, 
immune-compromised patients and pregnant women. 
In the end, most people affected experienced a rela-
tively mild illness and numbers were nowhere near as 
high as projected. The number known to have died by 
March 2010 was 457. In August 2010, WHO declared 
the end of the pandemic. The episode had really been 
a crisis that never was. 
Oral history interviews 
Our research focussed on oral history interviews. A 
brief literature review examined the historiography of 
past epidemics, among which the 1918 influenza 
epidemic loomed large – a past pandemic which 
became of particular interest to policy makers.13 We 
also looked at reviews of the 2009 response, including 
a recently published report by the Welsh CMO, Dame 
Deidre Hine.14 But most of our attention focussed on 
twenty-five informal interviews with HPA staff, which 
we carried out in 2010. The HPA provided an initial 
list of possible interviewees and this was modified as 
we developed the research and formed ideas about who 
we wanted to talk to. The aim was to talk to a cross-
section of the organisation as well as staff from 
different levels. There was no restriction on either who 
we spoke to or the topics and content of the interviews. 
They were carried out in different locations: some in 
the workplace, some at the LSHTM. We also 
responded to suggestions from interviewees about who 
they thought it was important to interview. Some inter-
views were carried out by Suzanne Taylor, some by me 
and some we conducted together. This was helpful in 
terms of developing interpretation. The interviews were 
recorded and ethical permission was obtained from the 
LSHTM ethics committee. Interviewees saw an infor-
mation sheet and signed a consent form that allowed 
for a choice of anonymity, use of attributed quotes 
and/or approval of quotes prior to publication. We kept 
to our brief, which was to interview HPA staff rather 
than other ‘players’ in the response. We were not given 
access to internal HPA documents. There is a danger 
of an ‘official view’ or ‘received line’ in the origins of 
an official project, but this was less the case as the 
research progressed. The immediate aftermath of 
perceived crisis proved to be a good time to interview 
as memories were fresh and concerns (which surfaced 
later) about policy acceptability were not apparent. The 
issue of timing was to recur in a less positive way when 
we moved to publication. 
Findings from the interviews 
In this section we will present some of the striking find-
ings from our interviews, which could have been useful 
in the policy context but, in the event, were not. The 
2009 pandemic has been discussed extensively, in 
particular in relation to the over-provision of vaccines, 
purchased in large quantities by government for an 
epidemic that never really happened.15 But the response 
also raised other important issues that are still of rele-
vance. We are not setting out a full historical analysis 
of the course of the epidemic here and our aim is not 
to criticise or blame. We rather highlight some issues 
that have received less discussion but which are 
nonetheless significant. In our draft report, we identi-
fied three phases of the response to swine flu. From 
April to June 2009 there was a period of containment, 
with the focus on limiting spread; the purpose was to 
slow the spread of the virus as much as possible. 
Another phase came from June to July when contain-
ment ended and treatment began, with WHO declaring 
the pandemic was at stage 6; the NHS National 
Pandemic Flu Service went live at the end of July. The 
first wave of infection peaked in July and the second 
in October. Finally, August to October was a time 
when the vaccination programme began, after discus-
sion. Cases diminished between December 2009 and 
April 2010 and the NHS National Pandemic Flu 
Service ceased operation in February 2010. 
We present the key issues that came from our inter-
views: 
• Initial shock and unplanned responses: flu response 
centres 
• Local responses: confusion between agencies 
• National responses: expert advice and political deci-
sion making 
• Risk communication 
• Moving to the new public health service. 
Initial shock and unplanned responses: flu 
centres 
Despite the extensive planning for a pandemic, a feel-
ing of shock and also excitement came over in the 
interviews. The first news of the outbreak in Mexico 
came through a casual comment. 
At the very end of March, we had a telephone con-
ference between the G7 countries and Mexico, as 
part of the global heath security initiative […] at the 
end […] Mexico came up and said that our flu is 
carrying on a bit longer than normal […] That was 
two o’clock in the morning for me […] and they 
asked a question, what was the situation in other 
countries? We said our flu finished early March or 
at the end of February and we have only seen one or 
two cases a week […] and they said, oh, we are still 
seeing quite a lot of flu.16  
The expected slow start did not occur. 
I should certainly have not been surprised that a pan-
demic would arrive, nevertheless I secretly harboured 
a view that the pandemic wouldn’t arrive until after I 
retired […] When it arrived the natural first reaction 
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to the first bit of news was, oh, that’s of no signifi-
cance, after all incidents involving flu in animals quite 
often spread into humans and cause small problems 
and then disappear. My first poor call [the intervie-
wee means misjudgement] was that it was unlikely 
that we would need to set up an incident room. That 
was a wrong call within about twelve hours. That 
would have been on 27 April. But then it built from 
there. The next expectation having recognised that 
actually this was a real issue was nevertheless that it 
would take quite a bit of time for it to arrive properly 
in the UK […] there too I was completely wrong and 
it arrived within a couple of days and it started build-
ing up pretty much straight away.17  
This initial period was one of containment as far as 
possible. Individual cases were investigated, surveil-
lance projects launched, schools closed, contacts 
traced and anti-viral drugs recommended for early 
treatment of all cases and for prophylaxis of close 
contacts. The aim was to slow spread as far as possible. 
Despite the extensive pre-planning, matters did not go 
according to plan. The blueprint envisaged that the 
NHS would set up and run a National Pandemic Flu 
Service (NPFS). But this was not ready in April 2009. 
The government decided on a policy of containment 
while the organisation became operational, and the 
HPA was asked to step in to provide these services. The 
HPA was thrust to the forefront of the response, which 
was not the role envisaged for it in the previous plan-
ning exercises.  
This period was the one that was remembered most 
vividly by our interviewees. The agency unexpectedly 
took on the role that had been intended for the NHS, 
identifying cases, tracing contacts and providing anti-
viral medication. This was done through what were 
called flu response centres, organisations that had not 
figured in any pre-planning. In May 2009, these were 
established in the ten Strategic Health Authority areas 
of England. Their provision stretched HPA staff and 
resources to the limit. Due to the lack of pre-planning, 
it was necessary to design and develop procedures, and 
to find new premises, people and software. The logis-
tics of the delivery of anti-virals proved a major 
problem. This new role for the HPA also produced 
problems in relationships with other health organisa-
tions. For example, the NHS still needed to be 
convinced that the HPA had a lead role to play during 
this phase. Such issues surfaced at the local level in 
particular and are discussed below. 
One interviewee among several remembered the 
unusual nature of the response. 
We were in the lead. So part of what we had to do 
then because this was not in anybody’s plan, it was-
n’t in the Health Protection Agency’s plan, it was in 
the department’s national flu plan, we had to 
design mechanisms to allow us to identify cases 
quickly, to make sure they were treated quickly, to 
trace the contacts of those cases, so that they could 
receive anti-viral drugs on a prophylactic basis and 
so on and so forth. We had to put our proposals for 
doing that into the Civil Contingencies Committee 
(CCC), it wasn’t just go away and do it, you know 
actually there was a very detailed control of the 
response at the ministerial committee, really very 
detailed […] We developed the idea of the regional 
response centres […] that were entirely novel and 
we set them up and got them working in a very 
short space of time, it might have been two weeks 
[…] including with new IT, new software system, 
premises, hardware, people and with some diffi-
culty persuading local NHS on the ground that 
they should give us the support that we felt we 
needed.18  
Local responses: confusion between 
agencies 
The local level was crucial to the response, but here 
agencies jostled in an uncoordinated way. The NHS, 
HPA and local government structures operated 
uneasily in relation to each other. The local level raised 
very starkly the problems of coordination and liaison 
with the NHS and local authorities but also of who 
was seen and accepted by all parties as being in charge. 
The closure of schools and treatment demonstrated 
these issues. In the containment phase confirmation of 
cases in a school led to closure for seven days. It was 
a controversial response, disruptive and more drastic 
than that taken by other countries. Those who were ill 
were offered treatment with the anti-viral Oseltamivir 
and were allowed to return to school when symptom 
free. Contacts were offered prophylaxis and if large 
numbers of cases meant contacts could not be identi-
fied then the year group or whole school was offered 
prophylaxis. 
This caused particular problems in areas that were 
flu hotspots such as Birmingham in the West Midlands. 
HPA staff were in charge of an operational response 
that had not been planned for or anticipated. The 
planned response had been for the HPA to have an 
advisory and support role to the NHS. Issues came 
thick and fast at the local level and the speed of 
outbreaks soon made containment unrealistic. 
Ramping up the response caused problems in finding 
and training staff, and in providing call centre services 
capable of handling thousands of calls. School closures 
caused particular problems. By early June it was clear 
that containment was no longer practicable. Postcode 
areas in Birmingham were declared hotspots, then on 
25 June the whole city was declared a hotspot. A local 
HPA staff member commented:  
You might have thought that the pandemic flu plans 
as they were might have led to some confusion on 
the day but they were quite clear I think that the 
NHS would be in charge, in coordinating and lead-
ing and commanding and the HPA would be provid-
ing support. Then of course on the day it wasn’t like 
that!19  
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The definition of flu changed from day to day and 
the team was criticised for missing a school outbreak 
when the algorithm used at the time emphasised travel-
related cases. 
Usually about four or five o’clock something 
would happen, we’d get a new algorithm or we’d 
get a new outbreak and we’d get a new problem in 
terms of the partners and their anxieties […] So by 
about six o’clock we were always sort of flat on our 
backs paddling very, very hard and it would take 
us until perhaps eleven o’clock at night, to actually 
get back into a position where we felt we could go 
home.20  
This interviewee summed up: 
So the combination of an endless stream of 
untrained people, new algorithms, collecting and all 
this criticism. As I say it was probably the hairiest 
thing I’ve ever dealt with in my whole professional 
career. So I suppose the big issues for me really were 
that we were never meant to be in charge, nobody 
really told the NHS that we were in charge, nobody 
explained really what it was we were trying to do and 
we tried to run a service that we are not geared up to 
run.21  
Staff had to run a service they had not planned for 
and for which resources were lacking. This local situ-
ation raised very starkly problems of coordination and 
liaison with the NHS and local authorities. Lack of 
clear management structures and the issue of who was 
in charge were never resolved. 
National responses: expert advice and 
political decision making  
The difficulties of the situation at the local and opera-
tional level in part derived from the nature of national 
policy making and the structures in place for planning. 
The HPA’s role in providing information and advice to 
central government was significant but also problem-
atic. In the UK during such an emergency, responses 
are coordinated through a set of official committees 
made up of civil servants and national politicians. At 
the time of the swine flu outbreak, the central commit-
tee was called the Civil Contingencies Committee 
(CCC) located in the Cabinet Office and sometimes 
also called COBRA, from the Cabinet Office Briefing 
Room where it met. This was the central policy and 
political decision-making body. Scientific advice was 
provided through expert committees, primarily the 
Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) 
and also the Joint Committee on Vaccination and 
Immunisation (JCVI). The CMO, the central public 
health official within government, also provided advice. 
The HPA’s role was to provide a situation report, or 
SitREP, to these meetings. Its production was an inten-
sive process: drawing information from across the 
agency in order to brief the committees on the number 
of new cases, number of consultations, school prob-
lems and international comparisons.  
The HPA’s role as an advisory one at the national 
level meant that it was in a subordinate role to other 
interests. It was represented on SAGE but our inter-
viewees felt that the committee should have incorpo-
rated more public health expertise, perhaps even 
doctors operating at the coal face, at the local level. It 
was difficult to emphasise the difficulties of the 
containment response at the local level. 
They felt advice should have been more open to the 
public with papers, minutes of the committee and 
advice published. The HPA had been able to present 
an agreed view from the organisation to the CCC 
thanks to its incident centre, which collated informa-
tion from across the agency. This unified view was 
contrasted sharply with a lack of consensus building in 
the committee as a whole, with other members having 
their debates in front of officials or ministers rather 
than prior to the meeting. 
This indirect influence had meant that it was diffi-
cult to secure politicians’ support when it became the 
HPA’s opinion that the containment phase was serving 
no useful purpose anymore and the balance of benefit 
and risk began to change. It began to emerge that for 
most people the flu was a mild self-limiting infection 
and the effects of anti-virals on children began to cause 
concern. However, the government response did not 
change easily. 
Ultimately politicians are looking to the public, that’s 
how […] they see themselves being judged. There-
fore they don’t want to be seen as changing their 
mind all the time, they don’t want to be seen as not 
being you know determined, decisive, so therefore 
something that says oh we’re going to change what 
we did in the West Midlands […] their worry was 
that […] is the way they would be perceived.22  
Another interviewee made the same point. 
The people on the committee wanted the contain-
ment phase to continue because it, public confi-
dence, was high in the government’s response, peo-
ple did feel the right things were being done, public 
confidence was high and to a politician, if you are 
doing something and the public are with you, why on 
earth would you stop doing it […] So that’s why it 
took several weeks to convince them that we actually 
needed to change.23  
So making the case at the national policy level to 
end containment took some while. Finally, in late June 
the new Minister of Health, Andy Burnham, came to 
Birmingham and saw the situation for himself. The 
move to a new approach followed soon after. 
The government was subsequently criticised for 
over-ordering vast stocks of vaccine, which were not 
used. The comments from HPA staff on this showed 
acceptance of the political and logistical constraints of 
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decision making. The higher profile of pandemic flu 
on the public health agendas of governments had given 
a fillip to vaccine production. One interviewee 
commented on timing. 
The reality is that if you are going to make a decision 
about vaccine, it takes three to four months and then 
you don’t have the benefit of the facts available to 
you in July, in April when you have to make the deci-
sion […] The vaccine arrived on schedule […] The 
problem was that in terms of slowing the spread it 
was too late. If you were going to do that, you had to 
hit it early and you had to probably look at the part 
of the population that was spreading it, which would 
have been children. And at the point we had suffi-
cient stocks of vaccine, the priority then became the 
risk groups because you had missed the chance to 
slow it. If we were going to slow it we should have 
done it in July/August time, the vaccine wasn’t ready 
until September at which point it was a case of tar-
geting the vulnerable groups.24  
Surveillance and research were important parts of 
dealing with the outbreak and provided crucial 
evidence for policy making. The outbreak placed this 
system under strain but also highlighted areas of devel-
opment and some forms of research, such as 
modelling, which were over-relied upon. Surveillance 
measures included hospital surveillance, collection and 
analysis of data from confirmed cases of H1N1 from 
laboratory testing, and contact tracing. Research 
focussed on the clinical, epidemiological and virologi-
cal features of the virus. A key mechanism was the 
FF100 or the First Few Hundred (cases), which had 
to expand rapidly as the outbreak developed. This 
provided epidemiological analysis to determine the 
virological and clinical characteristics of the virus, its 
potential for spread, and impact and risk factors. Staff 
commented on how the centralised NHS data systems 
on which the HPA relied and its laboratory services 
gave the health protection services an enviable advan-
tage over other countries with more fragmented 
services. However, looking back, they felt there were 
gaps in the data, such as the number of hospitalisa-
tions.  
In addition, modelling had had great influence and 
had used the 1918 flu epidemic as a perhaps surprising 
starting point. Some of the interviewees argued that 
serological data would have given a very different 
picture of the problem and a better understanding of 
the epidemic (and also of its resurgence in 2010). A 
subsequent outbreak of swine flu in 2010-2011 as part 
of seasonal flu took people by surprise. This later 
epidemic evoked quite a different government 
response, with a limited policy of vaccination and no 
national advertising campaign.  
Risk communication 
Media interest had proved intense during the first 
outbreak and the role of risk communication proved 
challenging. Staff felt that the HPA had managed its 
media relationships well. Initially, the HPA sent flu 
experts to front its media interviews, but they were 
soon overwhelmed by the demand and other senior 
staff were brought in. This involved a fast learning 
curve, in particular in relation to the media’s insatiable 
demand for up-to-the-minute information and hard 
numbers. 
Every afternoon at three pm the government 
announced the new numbers of cases, this only hap-
pened for a few weeks but when the cases were 
going up at a significant level. We knew the number 
of cases because it was from our Situation Report, 
that had been presented in the morning […] But 
then you’d sometimes get odd situations where in 
that window, that time between seven in the morn-
ing and three in the afternoon, either new cases 
would emerge and that was OK, we would just talk 
about them the following day, but what would hap-
pen if the media found out about some of the new 
cases […] and I had an interview in that period 
before the new cases had been announced and that 
happened once or twice. I remember it being slightly 
uncomfortable and having in my mind the number 
of cases I’m supposed to talk about […] So for 
instance there might have been no cases in Newcas-
tle […] that morning, but we knew that there were a 
couple in Newcastle.25  
Staff were supportive of the lead role of the CMO 
in dealing with the media but there were differences of 
opinion about how to explain the data to the public. 
The CMO, Sir Liam Donaldson, had good relation-
ships with members of the media. He held daily brief-
ings, which led to the reporting of the possibility of 
60,000 expected deaths. HPA staff were doubtful 
about this approach which came to over-focus on what 
was called ‘worst-case scenarios’.  
You know risk communication is a very difficult 
thing to do […] I think it’s a very bad policy to give 
any estimates because you just don’t know and you 
give a range and people will take the highest range 
[…] what’s more important is to convey the message 
that there are precautionary measures that need to 
be done and these measures are really an insurance 
policy in case things get worse. And that is the way 
you sell something like this, you sell the stockpile, 
you sell everything that way to the public […] you 
don’t say there might be a hundred million deaths, 
that is the wrong way to go. So anybody who uses 
figures is putting themselves into a very vulnerable 
position because modelling is only as good as what 
goes into a model […] I would not use figures […] 
the press rightfully so is waiting for figures and when 
they get a figure they take it and sometimes it’s por-
trayed out of context […] I think they took maxi-
mum figures. I don’t think they listened closely to 
what Sir Liam was saying.26  
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So rolling twenty-four-hour news created problems 
as did the focus on ‘real numbers’. The ways in which 
numbers were taken up often focussed on worst-case 
scenarios.  
The HPA also ended up providing information at 
the local level, to schools for example, on how to 
communicate with parents, not a role that had been 
planned for. In general, risk communication exposed 
divisions between different parts of the public health 
service at the national level, with the HPA much more 
inclined to circumspection about potential numbers 
than the CMO. 
Moving to the new public health service  
At the time we carried out our interviews, major 
changes were being planned in public health and health 
services in England and Wales. At the local level, the 
public health function (personnel and action), which 
had been located within the NHS since the early 1970s, 
was moving back into local government and local 
authority control. At the national level, a new national 
service now called Public Health England was to bring 
together all agencies into a consolidated public health 
department. There were mixed feelings among our 
interviewees about this. Consolidation could be advan-
tageous but it did raise the issue of loss of independence 
for decision making, which was seen as crucial for the 
expert advice given during the swine flu outbreak.  
What is coming is probably a very good move, to 
consolidate a public health department instead of 
just having a Department of Health because the ten-
sions that naturally exist between arm’s-length bod-
ies and the government will disappear. But then it’s 
a responsibility to be sure that the independence is 
maintained in decision making and that is the hard 
part.27  
There were concerns that the type of independent 
advice given by an arm’s-length agency would not be 
possible in the new situation where the new agency 
would be much closer to government and political 
decision making. Ultimately, these fears impacted on 
the use of our research. 
Crisis oral history and implications for 
policy 
In terms of the oral history of decision making, our 
research had been productive and relatively open in the 
way in which interviewees interacted with interviewers. 
The agency felt that it had done a good job in difficult 
circumstances; the crisis had not in the end happened 
as had been initially expected. There was less need to 
present an ‘official history’, at least at the time we 
conducted the interviews. Interviewees talked with 
relative openness about the alternative service they had 
had to set up, about problems in managing the media 
and in managing politicians through the central 
government committees. The research took place 
during a ‘window of opportunity’ for recollection 
before more official concerns set in. This also made it 
valuable as crisis oral history. It drew on the ‘confes-
sional relationship’ noted in other oral history 
interviewing.28 The fact that we were funded by the 
employing body mattered relatively little because the 
institutional esprit de corps and pride in what had been 
achieved in difficult circumstances was to the fore. 
Some of the urgency and emotion of responding to a 
pending emergency came across, in particular in the 
interviews dealing with the local response, one of 
which was highly emotional. Alongside emotion, there 
was also excitement and a positive sense of the waiting 
being over and public health staff swinging into a role 
for which they had been trained. The unexpected also 
came into this: staff ended up running services for 
which they had not been trained at all.  
However, our swine flu interviews and their 
funding also raised problems. Our research had raised 
significant relevant issues about public health struc-
tures and officials at both local and national levels: how 
they operated in coordination or not; the structure of 
pandemic planning at the local level; the relationship 
between local and national planning; the nature of 
expertise drawn upon; the political input into a 
pandemic response; relationships with the media 
during the outbreak; and risk communication to the 
public. Overall, they had shown that however much 
planning had been done, the unexpected can happen 
and that, too, should be built into planning in future. 
As someone who had also researched HIV/AIDS 
policy making, I recognised some familiar themes, 
including: the worldview of politicians about epidemics 
and the politics of epidemic response; the nature of risk 
communication, which could be unnecessarily apoca-
lyptic; and the over-reliance on modelling as a form of 
research. These were not new issues, but they did not 
seem to have been recognised or addressed in the 
interim (twenty years) since the advent of HIV/AIDS. 
Could the results from oral histories about the ‘crisis’ 
of swine flu feed into better policy understanding of 
how to respond to a health crisis? 
When we moved to finalise our report to the HPA 
we encountered problems. Many interviewees did not 
provide the necessary permission to use the quotes 
from their interviews. Time had passed and they felt it 
was inappropriate to draw attention to some of the 
issues given the pending changes to public health and 
the HPA at the national level. A number of interviewees 
had clearly been upset by events, especially in the early 
stages of unplanned response and the confusion at the 
local level. One interviewee had broken down in tears 
during the interview and it had to be resumed later. It 
had made for difficult interviews and later concerns 
about allowing the researchers to use the material. 
Time had passed and the openness of the early inter-
views had been replaced by greater wariness and a 
feeling that some comments might have been unwise. 
There was delay while the responses and permis-
sions from interviewees came in. Ultimately, we were 
told that our HPA contact would manage the process 
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in-house along with the publication. Time passed with 
no publication. As we had no control over what was 
written, I asked for our names to be removed from any 
publication produced without our consent. Then a 
fellow historian mentioned in passing that the HPA had 
meanwhile held a witness seminar to mark its short 
history and demise as a separate organisation. This had 
been published on its website. Swine flu received a 
brief mention, but none of the issues our research had 
raised were acknowledged, and our research was not 
mentioned. The chair of the board of the new succes-
sor organisation, Public Health England, was an 
honorary professor at the LSHTM. I wrote to him 
proposing that we be allowed to write an academic 
article from the research, with all interviews 
anonymised in such a way that respondents could not 
be identified. This was agreed and the present article 
has now been written, some years after the events. 
At the time we were carrying out our interviews, 
one official report had drawn conclusions. This was 
the independent review carried out by the Welsh CMO, 
Dame Deidre Hine, into the 2009 influenza pandemic, 
published in 2010. Its careful civil servant language 
makes for instructive reading. Dame Deidre found that 
the response had been ‘proportionate and effective’ but 
singled out some issues for comment such as: the 
tendency to talk of ‘worst-case scenarios’, which she 
saw as unhelpful; the over-reliance on modelling; and 
the need for population-based surveillance such as 
serology. She also favoured the public availability of 
scientific advice and forecasts. Her brief comments on 
the containment phase were clearly carefully phrased.  
I recognise the hard work of health services and 
health protection staff across the UK in delivering 
this part of the response. Many contributors to this 
Review believe that the steps taken during this period 
had some impact in slowing the initial spread, 
although this cannot be demonstrated definitively.29  
Subsequently, in 2011, the House of Lords Science 
and Technology Committee published a report on 
scientific advice and evidence in emergencies, which 
also picked up on some of the same points, in partic-
ular how language and terminology are used during 
outbreaks. For example, ‘worst-case scenario’ was seen 
as unhelpful but often put to use by the need to support 
appropriate levels of expenditure.30  
Our research raised significant issues about the 
nature of the response to a health emergency, which 
could have been drawn upon in assessing that response 
and in better planning for the future. Some of these 
dimensions were later discussed in academic output, 
in particular the confusion over the local response and 
the unnecessarily apocalyptic media coverage.31 What 
issues did the research raise for the twin themes on 
which we focussed at the outset? In terms of the offi-
cial funding of research, and in this case oral history, 
it matters greatly who controls the processes of funding 
and publication. Official funding was a positive factor 
at the outset as it gave us interview access quickly and 
there was little if no restriction on who we spoke to. 
But later it was a severe drawback not only on publi-
cation and dissemination, but also on drawing out the 
policy implications of the research, which could have 
been useful. On a practical note, the standard ethics 
permission required now in a medical or public health 
institution places power in the hands of the intervie-
wee. Such a format is intended for a clinical study and 
for patient participation, rather than for this type of 
oral history, which is not ‘history from below’. A previ-
ous study of AIDS policy making, where interviews 
with policy makers were also important, was not 
constrained in the same way because ethics committees 
and standard permissions did not exist then. Interviews 
were anonymised from the start unless the interviewee 
wanted to be identified.32  
In terms of crisis oral history, the research raised 
issues that had been discussed in the 1980s and 1990s 
in relation to HIV/AIDS and oral histories, again at a 
time of crisis. Oral history as a methodology was at the 
fore because of the immediacy of the health crisis in 
the 1980s. Its legitimacy was discussed and US 
researchers termed the process of doing historical 
interviews ‘slow journalism’.33 Interviewees had also 
communicated a sense of excitement and crisis 
response – in a sense, ‘the first draft of history’. This 
is a continuing and valuable function of crisis oral 
history undertaken at or near the time of crisis. Inter-
views undertaken later lack immediacy and of course 
‘the official line’ on events emerges as stories are told 
and retold. The ongoing policy issues surrounding the 
response to HIV/AIDS over a period of years had 
meant that some interviewees had tried to present ‘offi-
cial history’ while others were wary about their inter-
views being openly attributed.34 In the research on 
swine flu, time was also of the essence in recording the 
interviews, in part because it made funding for them 
available and interviewees keen to speak about their 
experience. However, later, time worked against us on 
both counts as the policy situation changed.  
Our experience with swine flu shows the potential 
power of oral history, but also, paradoxically, that 
some forms of history can be overused or be the 
‘wrong sort of history’. The impact of the 1918 
influenza epidemic was notable in 2009, not least in 
the way in which its mortality figures were built into 
pandemic modelling and led to unwarranted apocalyp-
tic projections of mortality then taken up by the media. 
Historians, including one of the authors of this article, 
have recently spent much time arguing that history 
should be brought into closer relationship with policy 
as evidence.35 Our experience in this case showed that 
elite oral history and the recollections in our interviews 
would have been a better form of historical input on 
which to base future planning for a health crisis. In the 
event, swine flu as a health ‘crisis’ died away and the 
virus is now a normal part of the range of viruses expe-
rienced by the population. The issues raised for oral 
history and for official funding, however, remain.
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